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Summary 
 The recent phenomenon of international outsourcing has taken place over the past 
few years. Based on OECD data, it is observed that the United States and the United 
Kingdom have experienced an upward trend on wage inequality over the years. Previous 
studies have linked the reason behind such a trend to the evolution of technology either 
due to international outsourcing or skilled-biased technical change. In this paper, we 
investigate the impact of international outsourcing on both wage inequality and 
entrepreneurs decision to outsource or perform in-house production. In addition, we 
postulate that technology evolves over time due to spillover effects by networks formed 
among firms undertaking integrated and outsourcing modes of production. Such an 
evolution of technology will affect the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers and the welfare of entrepreneurs versus domestic workers. 
We construct a simple dynamic model for a small, developed and open economy 
whereby the equilibrium organization of firms changes due to the formation of networks 
among domestic firms that undertake vertical integration and those that are engaged in 
outsourcing activities. The growth of integrated productivity and network knowledge 
stocks over time contributes to the growth of a common aggregate stock, which has 
spillover effects on the domestic economy in the next period. There exists a unique 
threshold level of entrepreneurial ability below (above) which firms elect to do vertical 
integration (international outsourcing). We show that in the long run, slightly more than 
half of the entrepreneurs will choose to do vertically integrated production. 
Although a static model without the evolution of the various stocks is inadequate 
in explaining the impact of networking on the domestic economy, it is able to explain the 
impact of other exogenous parameters adequately. We show that a reduction in the cost of 
manual components, an increase in foreign human capital and efficiency of matching 
firms with overseas supplier will increase the fraction of firms choosing to do outsourcing 
  v 
and subsequently affect wage inequality.  In addition, we investigate the impact of 
networking on GDP over time and find that an increase in outsourcing activities will 
benefit the welfare of entrepreneurs while decreasing the welfare of domestic workers. 
Furthermore, one of our striking results is that an increase in outsourcing activities is not 
necessary beneficial to the domestic economy throughout all cases. An increase in the 
ability of the entrepreneurs to match domestic firms to overseas supplier will result in a 
lower GDP in the long run.   
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1. Introduction 
 
By splitting up the production process into various components, international 
outsourcing has transformed the behavior of firms such that they no longer have to 
constrain production within the domestic country as they can now take advantage of the 
lower costs overseas. This is especially so when the host country for fragmented 
production components is a developing country. At the same time, the role of 
entrepreneurship has become increasingly important to not only utilize the cost 
advantage but also to manage production (Acemoglu et al., 2002b).  
In this paper, a simple dynamic model for a small, open and developed 
economy is constructed to examine the impact of the formation of network knowledge 
due to international outsourcing on the three key types of players in the domestic 
economy, which are namely the entrepreneurs, skilled and unskilled workers. We seek 
to investigate 1) the welfare between entrepreneurs and domestic workers and 2) the 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The model is able to trace the 
evolution of GDP, profits, and wage incomes over time given various shocks to the 
economy.   
Greiner, Rubart and Semmler (2004) have observed that wage inequality had 
been increasing in the United States (U.S) and the United Kingdom (U.K) from early 
1960s to late 1990s1. However, the pattern of wage inequality for West Germany is 
unclear. Using OECD data, they observed that wage inequality in West Germany has 
been decreasing over time from 1984 to 1996. In contrast, using disaggregated data 
from the Federal Office of Statistics, they observed that there is an upward trend in 
wage inequality. Most studies have attributed the upward trend due to the evolution of 
technology. Some of the most commonly cited reasons for the evolution of technology 
over time are skilled-biased technological change (Galor and Moav, 2000) and the 
                                                
1 For the U.S, U.K and West Germany, cross-country data of wage differentials are taken from OECD 
Employment Outlook (1993,1996) whereby wage inequality is measured using the ratios of the 10th and 
50th percentile to the 90th percentile wage earners. 
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development of skill-complementary technology due to the rapid increase in the supply 
of skilled labor (Acemoglu et al., 2002a). DeGroot (2001) also proposed that an 
increase in the efficiency of R&D labor via the accumulation of own past knowledge 
can achieve technical progress. Moreover, under the assumption that capital and 
unskilled labor are complements, Greiner, Rubart and Semmler (2004) postulated that 
technical progress is embodied within new capital goods since the amount of new 
capital goods affects the efficiency of both skilled and unskilled labor. According to 
Gao (2005)s paper, he also postulated that the worlds growth rate increases when 
more resources are concentrated on R&D in the North2, given a reduction in trade costs 
due to globalization. Egger and Grossmann (2005) further postulated that the provision 
of firm-specific on-the-job training by high-skilled, non-production labor leads to 
accumulation of human capital.  
We break away from these usual conventions by postulating that the change in 
wage inequality over time is mainly due to the interaction effects of network stocks 
formed by entrepreneurs involved in integrated and outsourcing modes of production. 
One major motivation for the incorporation of network knowledge is that international 
outsourcing can be hindered by informal trade barriers, such as weak enforcement of 
international contracts (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) and inadequate information 
about international trading opportunities (Portes and Rey, 1999). Thus, we adopt Rauch 
(2001)s approach whereby the development of business and social networks operating 
across national borders not only alleviate these problems, but also help in facilitating the 
transfer of technology to the recipient country. These networks also enable foreign agents 
to be connected to domestic networks via intermediaries.  
This is consistent with the increasing role of intra trade between parent firms and 
their affiliates as observed in reality. In Figure 1-1, although there are some fluctuations 
                                                
2 A North-South endogenous growth model is used, whereby the North is abundant in skilled-labor. It 
is also assumed to be the only innovator in the world. In the model, there is relocation of production of 
unskilled components to the South.  
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in the ratio of volume of imports and exports between U.S parent companies and their 
foreign affiliates to the total volume of U.S imports and exports from 1982 to 1988, there 
is an upward trend in the percentage ratio from 1989 to 1994.  Hence, over the period of 
12 years, intra trade between U.S parent companies and their foreign affiliates has been 
steadily increasing from 18.8% in 1982 to 21.6% in 1994. 
FIGURE 1-1: PERCENTAGE RATIO OF VOLUME OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
BETWEEN U.S PARENT COMPANIES AND THEIR FOREIGN AFFILIATES TO 












1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
 
Source:  Our computations are based on U.S data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis3 
 
In addition, using input-output data from six OECD countries and German time-
series data, Kleinert (2003) has also found strong empirical evidence of growing trade in 
intermediate goods due to the increasing importance of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) 
networks.  
The development and enhancement of such networks can lead to the accumulation 
of knowledge due to learning activities from abroad through the overseas intermediaries. 
As a result, technical progress takes place. For instance, through establishing 
intermediaries in Singapore, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have gained knowledge 
such as better labor and capital management, and more efficient management of 
                                                
3 We obtain the ratio by dividing the volume of exports and imports in terms of millions of US dollars 
between U.S parent companies and their foreign affiliates by the total volume of U.S exports and 
imports in terms of millions of US dollars. This is in turn multiplied by 100% in order to obtain the 
percentage ratio. 
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processing activities. They can therefore apply the knowledge gained to their parent 
companies, hence increasing their efficiency and output over time. We therefore adopt a 
simple framework that captures the evolution of technology due to the formation of 
networks.  
Using a simple dynamic model, we assume that there are two organizational 
forms of production in the domestic economy producing similar final products, namely 
vertically integrated production and outsourcing. We further assume that firms in the 
developed country are homogeneous and unconstrained by contracts. Firms adopting the 
vertically integrated mode of production are defined to produce both manual and skilled 
components, thereafter combining them to form a final product. In contrast, firms 
engaged in the outsourcing mode concentrate on producing skilled components and 
purchase manual components from an overseas supplier in a foreign, developing country, 
which is abundant in unskilled labor. The final product is produced through assembling 
them by the domestic firms. We hence investigate the impact of domestic firms forming 
networks within the two modes of production respectively, on the domestic economy. To 
introduce dynamics to the model in a simple manner, we let both types of networking 
affect the growth of integrated productivity stock and entrepreneurial network stock over 
time, which will in turn affect the aggregate stock of knowledge in the economy. The 
aggregate stock of knowledge will also influence the accumulation of the stocks of 
integrated productivity and entrepreneurial network in the next period. In this manner, we 
examine the dynamic linkage between the three stock variables  integrated productivity 
stock, entrepreneurial network stock, and aggregate stock of knowledge in the economy.  
We examine the above model via the incorporation of entrepreneurial ability to 
determine the threshold level above which international outsourcing will occur, which is 
often neglected by previous literature. This is crucial since entrepreneurs are required to 
train workers and coordinate outsourcing activities. In the outsourcing mode of 
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production, entrepreneurial ability is required to find the appropriate suppliers in the 
foreign, developing country. At the same time, entrepreneurs are required to train skilled 
labor to produce skilled components. Hence, the higher the ability to match firms to 
supplier, the higher the profit earned by the domestic firms. In the other mode of 
production, there is no need for entrepreneurial ability in matching since the integrated 
form of production is done in-house. However, entrepreneurial time is required to train 
both skilled and unskilled labor to produce skilled and unskilled components respectively. 
Another key assumption to note is that both home and foreign countries are assumed to 
have totally different production structures. Thus, human capital is assumed to be 
exogenous and different across the two countries. 
This idea is similar to the manager in Acemoglu et al. (2000b)s model who have 
to spend time on both production and innovation activities, where skills are more 
important for the latter. However, in their paper, there exists only corner solution in the 
economy which is namely imitation-based or innovation-based equilibrium. This is 
mainly due to their assumption that the skill level of the manager takes on only two 
values to indicate that he is either high or low-skilled. We differ from their paper by 
assuming that the ability is uniformly distributed among entrepreneurs so as to allow for a 
mixed equilibrium, which is more consistent with reality. This implies that the higher the 
threshold level of entrepreneurial ability, the lower the fraction of firms outsourcing the 
manual part of the production activities. 
 The idea of the threshold level of entrepreneurial ability is reminiscent of 
managerial incentives in Grossman and Helpman (2003). Using a threshold level of 
revenue that acts as the main determinant in choosing the organizational form and the 
location of their subsidiaries or suppliers, managerial incentives of heterogeneous firms in 
an industry were examined in the short run. This is under the assumption that the 
principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of contracts with suppliers and 
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employees. These principals can elect to outsource the production of components by 
choosing a supplier either in the North or in the South. Input costs and skills required to 
head a production unit are assumed to be lower in the South. They mainly investigated 
how firms with different productivity levels are sorted into different organizational forms. 
They suggested that the least and most productive firms will choose to obtain components 
from external suppliers from the South and the North respectively. Moreover, firms that 
operate foreign subsidiaries will be less productive than those that manufacture their own 
components in a plant nearer to their headquarters. Even though we adopt a different 
approach from theirs, our model in this paper however provides a richer picture since we 
investigate the transition of the threshold level of entrepreneurial ability over time.  
Our results reveal that there exists a mixed equilibrium in the long run whereby at 
a unique threshold level of entrepreneurial ability, slightly more than half of the firms in 
the economy will prefer vertical integration to international outsourcing. This is 
consistent with the trend in Figure 1 whereby the share of intra trade between U.S parent 
companies and foreign affiliates accounted for less than 50% of U.S total trade in the time 
period between 1982 and 1994. We also show that although the static model (without the 
evolution of the stock variables) is inadequate in explaining the impact of networking on 
the domestic economy, it is able to explain the impact of other exogenous parameters. We 
find that a reduction in the inefficiency of matching domestic firms to overseas supplier 
and a decline in the cost of manual components obtained from the overseas supplier will 
result in a lower threshold level of managerial ability. At the same time, wage inequality 
falls. Going one step further, we also compare our findings with previous literatures 
results and find that most studies have only examined the impact on wage inequality or 
the decision to outsource, but not both at the same time. Hence, we are able to provide a 
richer model on the interdependence between entrepreneurs, skilled and unskilled workers. 
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Our model also reveals that as outsourcing activities increase, the welfare of 
workers decreases, while entrepreneurs welfare increases. Hence there is a trade off 
between the welfare of workers and entrepreneurs. Ethier (2005) has postulated that given 
the degree of complementarity between skilled labor and equipment, an increase in 
fragmentation will worsen the policy trade off of limiting the skill premium while 
maximizing employment. Our model is richer than Ethiers as he has failed to take into 
account the role of entrepreneurs, hence neglecting to compare welfare between 
entrepreneurs and domestic workers.  
 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static 
model and static optimization. Section 3 outlines the dynamic model and its steady state 
outcome, followed by a detailed discussion on the comparative statics for both static and 
dynamic models. A general discussion on the implications of the results is provided in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. The Model 
In this section, we first examine a simple static model set up before looking at the 
dynamic model in the latter section, whereby the evolution of network knowledge and 
integrated productivity stocks is introduced.  
 
2.1 A Simple Static model 
In our model setup, we adopt some features similar to Acemoglu et al. (2002b). 
The economy consists of a continuum of non-overlapping generations of one-period lived 
agents. In each generation, there constitutes a mass 1 of entrepreneurs, which are the 
owners of the intermediate firms in the economy. They are profit maximizers and have 
the option to either engage in vertical integration within the economy, or to outsource the 
manual aspect of the production process to a foreign, developing country with abundant 
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unskilled labor, depending on the level of their entrepreneurial ability. Thus, there are two 
organizational forms of production in the economy. Firms produce according to an 
aggregate production function, which varies according to the form chosen. Hence, firms 
undertaking either mode of production produce a single, all-encompassing final good of 
unitary price, and operate within a perfectly competitive environment.  
 
2.2 The Production Process 
Firms require either a combination of technology, unskilled labor and human 
capital augmented skilled labor or previous period network knowledge and human capital 
augmented skilled labor, depending on the organizational form of production chosen. All 
firms adhere to an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function which satisfies the usual 
Inada conditions. We further assume that all firms experience decreasing returns to scale. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a fixed exogenous supply of high-skilled 
and low-skilled labor in the economy. Hence, we assume that skilled labor is mobile 
between firms undertaking the two different forms of production: 
SOSIS LLL +=          (1) 
and total labor supply in the economy is equivalent to: 
SU LLL +=           (2) 
 
2.2.1  Firms Choosing To Adopt Vertical Integration 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is: 
( ) δγβα )(),(, SItsttututSItsttutI HLtALtHLtgLtfB ==      (3) 
where ( )1,0,,, ∈δγβα . Firms hire unskilled labor utL  and human capital augmented 
skilled labor or effective labor SItHL , and therefore incur wage costs from hiring skilled 
and unskilled labor, which are denoted by utw and 
s
tw respectively. In addition, 
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entrepreneurs are required to split their time in training unskilled labor, utt  and skilled 
labor, stt , such that: 
1=+ st
u
t tt            (4)
 According to Acemoglu et al. (2002b), managerial overload is modeled by 
introducing a convex cost of effort into the cost function, whereby the higher the 
managerial effort, the higher the marginal cost of such effort. Since our model does not 
have a cost function for the coordination of activities for firms involved in integrated 
production, we model entrepreneurial overload in the training of unskilled and skilled 
labor through the parameters α  and γ  respectively, as utt  and stt   lies between zero and 
one. Similarly, as utL  and 
SI
tL are less than one, β  and δ  imply that unskilled workers 
and effective workers increase at a diminishing rate respectively. 
 
2.2.2 Firms Choosing To Engage In  Outsourcing Activities 
Firms follow an aggregate production structure similar to that adopted in the 










χ        (5) 
 
where ( )1,0,,, ∈dcba . The firm outsources the manual component to the foreign, 





, where ρ and ( )1,0∈ν . It can also be interpreted as the effective cost incurred 
after adjusting for the productivity of the supplier. ρ  is seen as an indexing parameter 
and represents the cost before quality or productivity adjustment i.e. service link costs 
such as telecommunication, transport and coordination costs. A higher ρ  would indicate 
that cost has increased, leading to an increase in the effective cost of purchasing the 
manual component.  
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The cost decreases with an increase in the foreign economys human 
capital h , ( )1,0∈h . We assume that better-trained foreign workers are more efficient in 
producing the labor-intensive product but such efficiency diminishes with additional 
increase in human capital via the parameterν . In addition, it is assumed that the foreign 
economy follows a production structure such that UNtf LV λ= where UNtL  denotes the total 
number of unskilled labor in the developing country andλ is an indexation productivity 
parameter for overall production in the foreign country. Since the two countries have 
different production structures, fV is assumed to be exogenous and experiences 
diminishing returns such that ( )1,0∈χ . To simplify, fV can be also known as the 
marginal product of manual component. 
 tm denotes entrepreneurial ability and is uniformly distributed between zero and 
one. Thus, the parameter b  is the inverse of the matching of domestic firms with the 
overseas supplier. Since 1ptm , the ability of a successful match decreases with an 
increase in b . It is to be noted that b  is exogenous and may be influenced by government 
policies that facilitate success matching. 1−tK refers to previous period network 
knowledge and lies between zero and one in the static model. Thus, a  refers to the 
inefficiency of network knowledge contributing to present period output.   
Since unskilled components have been outsourced to the foreign country, 
entrepreneurs are no longer required to hire and train unskilled workers and can fully 




tt  denotes the 
time spent on training skilled workers in the outsourcing mode of production.  Therefore, 
c denotes the share of time spent in training skilled labor. Similarly, as SOtHL is less than 
one, the total amount of effective workers increases at a diminishing rate through the 
parameter d .  
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2.3 Profit Functions 
Assuming that the price of the final product P  takes on the unitary value of 1, 
firms adopting vertical integration face the aggregate profit function, which is denoted 










t LwLwB −−=π         (6) 
On the other hand, the portion of the firms that engages in international outsourcing 
















π         (7) 
 
2.4 Optimization Behavior Across The Economy. 
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 (9) 
subject to 1=SOtt , since 0=
u
tt .        
The Langrangian for each profit function can be written as follows: 




















tI ttLwLwHLtALt −−+−−= λδ
γβα




























χl  (11) 
where 1λ  and 2λ  are the co-state variables for 1l  and 2l respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Firms Engaging In Vertical Iintegration 
The solutions obtained from the first order conditions are as follows: 
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1
1 )( λα δγβα =− SItsttutut HLtALt       (12) 
1






















−1)( δγβαδ        (15) 
1=+ st
u
t tt           (16) 
Equation (12) is seen as the marginal benefit of training unskilled labor to its 
marginal cost. Similarly, equation (13) is the marginal benefit of training skilled labor to 
its marginal cost. The left hand sides of equations (14)-(15) show the marginal products 
of the respective types of labor, whereas the right-hand sides are the marginal costs.  






















































































































wwL     (20) 
From equations (19) and (20), we observe that the demand functions for unskilled 
and skilled labor supply are constrained by wage costs, integrated productivity and human 
capital in the economy.  
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Proposition 1: Profit for integrated production is positive if and only if the condition 
1pδβ +  exists. 
Proof:  See Appendix A.  
 
Hence, proposition 1 shows that both effective and unskilled labor must increase 
at a diminishing rate such that profit for integrated production is positive. Otherwise, 
firms will have to hire a large amount of effective and unskilled workers, resulting in 
negative profit as wage costs increase.  
Substituting equations (17) to (20) back into equation (6), we can re-express the 
















































































































t Aww ,,π          (21) 
It can be seen that Itπ has a positive relationship with integrated productivity whereas 
skilled and unskilled wages are inversely related with it. 
 
2.4.2 Firms Engaging in  Outsourcing Activities 
This time, the solutions under first order conditions are: 
2
1





































1        (24) 
1=stt            (25) 
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 Equation (22) shows that the marginal benefit of training skilled labor is equaled 
to its marginal cost while equation (23) shows the marginal benefit of hiring skilled labor 
equaled to its marginal cost. Equation (24) indicates the marginal benefit of manual 
component to the marginal cost of acquiring it. Similarly, solving equations (22) to (25), 






































































































    (27) 
From equations (26) and (27), it can be seen that the marginal product of manual 
component and demand for skilled labor are constrained by the cost of the manual 
component, previous period network knowledge stock, entrepreneurial ability, human 
capital and skilled wages. 
 
Proposition 2: Profit for outsourcing mode of production is positive if and only if the 
condition 1pχ+d  exists. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
 Thus, proposition 2 indicates that effective labor and marginal product of manual 
component must be increasing at a diminishing rate in order for entrepreneurs engaging in 
outsourcing activities to earn positive profits. If both increase at an increasing rate, 
entrepreneurs will earn negative profit as they have to incur higher costs in hiring more 
effective labor and purchasing manual components. 
Similarly, substituting equations (26) and (27) back into equation (7): 
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t mKw ,, 1π         (28) 
 From equation (28), it can be seen that previous period network knowledge, 
entrepreneurial ability and human capital are positively related to Otπ while skilled wages 
and marginal product of manual component are inversely related to it.  
 
2.5 Equilibrium 
 In this section, we analyze firms decision to engage in international outsourcing 
or integration, depending on entrepreneurial ability. Firms will only decide to adopt the 
former when the profit from engaging in it is greater than that from vertical integration, 
i.e. It
O
t ππ > .  
 
2.5.1 Threshold Level of Managerial Ability 
Setting Ot
I
t ππ =  from equations (21) and (28) and rearranging the terms, we 
obtain the critical threshold level of managerial ability: 
























































































*     (29) 
 where  






















































































W  (30) 







































   (31) 
 
Proposition 3: Given the 3 conditions: 1) 1pδβ +  in Proposition 1, 2) 1pχ+d  in 
Proposition 2 and  
3) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )

























































11p , an 
interior solution exists for *tm  . 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
 Proposition 3 indicates that if skilled wages are too large, all entrepreneurs will 
switch to vertically integrated production such that 1* =tm as the cost of hiring skilled 
labor is too high for firms involved in outsourcing activities to earn positive profit. Hence, 
these three conditions must hold for 10 * pp tm  to exist. 
 From equation (29), several things can be noted. There exists a unique *m  
whereby entrepreneurs with *mmt p will find it more profitable to undertake vertical 
integration, whereas those with *mmt f  will choose to outsource manual component of 
the production process to the developing country. Secondly, we assumed that 
entrepreneurial ability is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], thus *m  is 
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constrained by the value 1. When 1* =m , this implies that all managers find it profit-
maximizing to engage in vertical integration. On the contrary, all firms prefer to choose 
the outsourcing mode of production when 0* =m . Thus, a mixed equilibrium exists 
when 10 * pp m , whereby managers decide to undertake vertical integration or outsource, 
depending on managerial ability.  
 
2.5.2 Labor Market Equilibrium 
From equations (19), (20) and (27), we can derive the demands for unskilled and 
skilled workers in the domestic economy: 








































































wAww ,  (33) 
whereas  





































































































































































ρφ   (36) 
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 Since the supply of unskilled and skilled labor, which are denoted by
U
L  and 
S
L respectively, are assumed to be exogenous, we can solve for equilibrium wages in the 
labor market by equating equation (32) to
U
L  and equation (34) to
S
L . After rearranging 

















































































































































































































































































αδφ   (41) 
It can be seen from the two labor equations that the terms are too complicated to be 
solved simply. Together with equation (29), assuming that the two state variables tA  
and 1−tK  are exogenous, there are three endogenous variables in this system of equations, 




tw . Therefore, we shall use numerical simulation to solve for the 
three equations (29), (37) and (38) and study the properties of the system.  
Since the two labor equations are functions of *tm , we vary 
*
tm  to solve for the 
equilibrium values of stw  and 
u
tw . Thereafter, we substitute all the equilibrium values 
back into the two profit functions to obtain Figure 2-1. Hence, the figure shows the two 
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profit functions corresponding to the two different modes of production, which are 
denoted by Itπ  and 
O
tπ  respectively, with respect to the level of entrepreneurial ability m .  
I
tπ  shows a downward sloping convex curve, whereas 
O
tπ  is an upward sloping concave 
curve. The intersection of the two curves will give a unique *m .  From the figure, it is 
obvious that entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial ability less than *m  will opt to undertake 
vertical integration in order to maximize profit. On the contrary, those with 
entrepreneurial ability greater than *m  will choose to outsource the manual aspect of the 
production process to the foreign country. This is because profit earned from outsourcing 
activities is higher than that from vertical integration. Besides indicating firms decision 
to outsource or do vertical integration, the unique threshold level shows the share of firms 
that undertakes vertical integration as *m . In contrast, *1 m−  indicates the amount of 
firms engaging in outsourcing activities.  
Hence *m have two properties: 1) the ability of entrepreneurs to match firms to 
foreign supplier and 2) a measure of the fraction of firms choosing to adopt vertical 
integration. 
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 3. Dynamic Model 
 
 
 In this section, we introduce simple evolution mechanism of the entrepreneurial 
network stock and integrated productivity stock and proceed to investigate how the 
evolutions of the two stock variables, tA and tK , may affect the organizational form of 
production and factor prices over time. 
 
3.1 The Model 
  
 We assume that interaction between firms involved in vertical integration and 
outsourcing activities in the domestic economy has spillover effects on next periods 





1 )1( −−−− −+= ttttt KmAmT         (42) 
 
 Thus, present periods common aggregate stock is influenced by spillover effects 
from previous periods entrepreneurial ability * 1−tm , integrated productivity stock 1−tA  and 
network knowledge stock 1−tK . Such spillover effects will indirectly affect both the 
evolutions of present periods tA and tK .  
For the evolution of network knowledge stock, we use the following equation: 
11
*




tt KmTCK ε        (43) 
 
where )1,0(,,, 1111 ∈εknC . Since 1−tT  is less than 1, 1n refers to the inefficiency of last 
periods common aggregate stock contributing to current network knowledge stock while 
1k refers to the inverse of networking efficiency among firms engaging in outsourcing 
activities. 1C acts as an indexing parameter to the first term in the equation and can be 
treated as aggregate productivity. In the second term of the equation, 1ε  refers to the rate 
at which previous periods network knowledge depreciates. Hence, the second term on 
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the right hand side of the equation indicates the portion of past periods network 
knowledge that contributes to future network knowledge stock. 
 The equation for the evolution of integrated productivity stock follows a similar 










tt AmTCA ε        (44) 
where )1,0(,,, 2222 ∈εknC . Similarly, 2n indicates the inefficiency of last periods 
common aggregate stock contributing to integrated productivity stock while 2k refers to 
the inverse of networking inefficiency among firms choosing to undertake vertical 
integration. Similarly, 2C  is treated as an aggregate productivity to tA  and 2ε determines 
the rate at which integrated productivity depreciates. Hence, we observe that the common 
aggregate stock tT  is eventually made up of lagged effects of tT and
*
tm  since tT  is a 
function of 1−tK  and 1−tA . 
      
3.2 Baseline Steady- state System  
 





= tt mm , 1−= tt AA and 1−= tt KK , we can obtain: 


















t AmTC ε                 (47) 





















































































*     (48) 
 where  






















































































W  (49) 



















































































































































































































































































































αδφ   (55) 
Substituting equations (43) and (44) into equations (46) and (47) respectively, we can 
further obtain: 
( )[ ] 0)1(1 1*** =−−−+ tktntttt KmKmAmC ε        (56) 
and ( )[ ] 01 2*** =−−+ tktntttt AmKmAmC ε               (57) 
Using equations (48), (51), (52), (56) and (57) to solve for the baseline steady state values, 
it can be seen that the equations are too complex to simply obtain an analytical solution 
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for the five endogenous variables stttt wAKm ,,,
*  and utw . Subsequently, we use numerical 
simulation4 to obtain the baseline values and the corresponding comparative statics of the 
system of equations. 
 
3.3 Parameterization 
The parameter values for the baseline simulation of both static and dynamic 
models are presented in Table 1 and 2 respectively. We have adopted the same parameter 
values for the numerical simulation of the dynamic model, so that we can easily analyze 
the changes in the endogenous variables in both short and long runs. 
The appropriate parameters are being set at values so as to satisfy Propositions 1, 
2 and 3, which have held the guidelines 1) profits for both modes of production are 






is greater than one and 3) there exists an interior solution 
for *tm . Since our focus is on a mixed equilibrium in the economy, corner solutions are 
ignored.  
The supply of skilled labor SL  is also assumed to be 0.7, in order to reflect the 
fact that the domestic developed country has a larger pool of skilled labor. The human 
capital of foreign labor market h is set to be 0.2, which is lower than the domestic 
countrys human capital of 0.3 so as to reflect the lower level of human capital in the 
foreign, developing country. Moreover, we assume 21 αα p  because setting 21 αα =  and 
21 αα f  do not yield any interior solution in the dynamic model. We further assume that 
21 εε p  in the dynamic model, whereby integrated productivity stock depreciates faster 
than network knowledge stock, otherwise no interior solution can be achieved as all firms 
will move towards integrated production when 21 εε f or 21 εε = . Intuitively, 
                                                
4 All numerical simulations are run using MATLAB 6.1. 
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entrepreneurs who are involved in international outsourcing are more capable than those 
choosing to adopt vertical integration since they have higher entrepreneurial ability. 
Therefore, the network knowledge stock created is more durable than integrated 
productivity stock. This results in the former stock depreciating slower than the latter 
stock.  
Given these parameters, we are able to obtain a unique and stable steady state 
solution for each of the endogenous variables, where no multiple equilibriums exist. To 
check the stability of these steady state values, we have done some calibrations and 
observe that any slight (1%) changes in the values will always evolve back to the original 
steady state values. The existence of a unique and stable steady state for the threshold 
level of entrepreneurial ability tallies with reality, whereby firms choose either to 
outsource or undertake vertical integration. 
TABLE 1: PARAMETER VALUES USED FOR BASELINE STATIC MODEL 
Parameter Value 
Entrepreneurial overload in training unskilled labor α  0.15 
Diminishing rate of unskilled workers β  0.1 
Entrepreneurial overload in training skilled labor γ  0.3 
Diminishing rate of effective labor hired in integrated production δ  0.3 
Cost before quality adjustment ρ  0.79 
Diminishing rate of manual component χ  0.25 
Inefficiency of network knowledge contributing to present period 
output a  0.1 
Inverse of matching between domestic firms and overseas supplier b  0.6 
Diminishing rate of effective labor hired in outsourcing  d  0.1 
Human capital in foreign labor market h  0.2 
Decrease in efficiency of foreign labor producing low-skilled 
intensive components v  0.2 
Skilled labor supply 
S
L  0.7 
Unskilled labor supply 
U
L  1 
Human capital in local labor market H   0.3 
Integrated productivity stock tA  0.5457 
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TABLE 2: PARAMETER VALUES USED FOR BASELINE SIMULATION 
Parameter Value 
Entrepreneurial overload in training unskilled labor α  0.15 
Diminishing rate of unskilled workers β  0.1 
Entrepreneurial overload in training skilled labor γ  0.3 
Diminishing rate of effective labor hired in integrated production δ  0.3 
Cost before quality adjustment ρ  0.79 
Diminishing rate of manual component χ  0.25 
Inefficiency of network knowledge contributing to present period 
output a  0.1 
Inverse of matching between domestic firms and overseas supplier b  0.6 
Diminishing rate of effective labor hired in outsourcing  d  0.1 
Human capital in foreign labor market h  0.2 
Decrease in efficiency of foreign labor producing low-skilled 
intensive components v  0.2 
Skilled labor supply 
S
L  0.7 
Unskilled labor supply 
U
L  1 
Human capital in local labor market H   0.3 
Inefficiency of last period aggregate stock contributing to current 
network knowledge 1n  0.3 
Inefficiency of last period aggregate stock contributing to current 
network knowledge 2n  0.3 
Aggregate productivity in evolution of network knowledge stock 1C  0.3 
Aggregate productivity in evolution of integrated productivity 
stock 2C  0.3 
Inverse of networking efficiency in outsourcing mode 
1k  0.3 
Inverse of networking efficiency in integrated production mode 
2k  0.3 
Rate at which previous network knowledge depreciates. 1ε  0.3 
Rate at which previous integrated productivity stock depreciates. 2ε  0.4 
 
3.4. Simulation Results 
The baseline steady state values are presented in Table 3 below.  
TABLE 3: BASELINE STEADY STATE VALUES 
Threshold level of 
entrepreneurial ability, 
SSm*  
0.5860 Skilled wage, 
SSsw  0.0952 
Integrated productivity 
stock, SSA  0.5457 
Unskilled wage, 
SSuw  0.0173 
Network knowledge stock, SSK  0.6556 Common aggregate stock, SST  0.5912 
Note: The above values are all corrected to 4 significant figures. 
It can be seen from the above table that there exists a unique and stable mixed 
equilibrium in the long run. Slightly more than half of the total number of entrepreneurs 
in the economy will choose to adopt vertical integration whereas the remaining portion 
will engage in outsourcing activities. The baseline wage gap is observed to be 5.5029. 
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Since the common aggregate stock SST is a function of SSm* , SSA and SSK , it is 
sufficient to look at the changes in the five endogenous variables, which are namely 
SSm* , 
SSsw , 
SSuw , SSA and SSK . We also note that it is impossible to show a phase diagram for 
these endogenous variables. Hence, in the following section, individual phase diagram 
will be generated for each of them. We observe that tK and tA will evolve smoothly to 
the steady state values since they are state variables. They do not jump upon any changes 
even though a 1% variation is made one at a time for each exogenous variable, and 
therefore undergo a smooth transition to the new steady state values. 
 
3.5 Welfare Of The Domestic country 
 
Using the baseline steady state values, we can easily obtain the GDP of the 
domestic country at each time period by summing up the total profits of all firms 
undertaking vertical integration, total profits of all firms doing outsourcing activities, 
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 (58)      
Thus, we can obtain the baseline values for the various components of GDP, which is 
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TABLE 4: BASELINE VALUES FOR VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF GDP 
GDP 0.2841 Labor income of skilled workers 0.0667 
Profit of all firms undertaking 
integrated mode of production  0.1036 
Labor income of unskilled 
workers  0.0173 
Profit of all firms undertaking 
outsourcing mode of production  0.0967     
Note: The above values are all corrected to 4 significant figures. 
Therefore, in the long run, it can be seen that the total profits of all firms 
undertaking integrated mode of production is greater than that for all firms undertaking 
outsourcing mode of production as more than half of the all entrepreneurs in the economy 
will choose to engage in the integrated mode of production.  
 
 3.6 Comparative Statics Analysis 
In this section, we examine the effects of various exogenous changes, one at a 
time, on the five endogenous values. Before proceeding to do so, we first present a 
summary of the comparative statics for the static model in Table 5.  As tK and tA  are 
chosen at steady state values in the static model, it thus shows the short run effects on the 
economy. Thereafter, Table 6 shows a summary of the comparative statics for the 
dynamic model. Thus, we analyze short run and long run changes based on these two 
tables. Moreover, we analyze the transition of GDP and its various components over time. 
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ws wu ws/wu 
% change in 
wage gap, 
ws/wu 
α  0.58499 -0.17065 0.09504 0.01721 5.52287 0.11572 
β  0.58547 -0.08874 0.09524 0.01743 5.46292 -0.97104 
γ  0.58524 -0.12799 0.09509 0.01722 5.52125 0.08751 
δ  0.58167 -0.73721 0.09580 0.01709 5.60666 1.63470 
ρ  0.58803 0.34813 0.09526 0.01731 5.50373 -0.23123 
χ  0.59157 0.95223 0.09541 0.01739 5.48766 -0.52242 
a  0.58634 0.05973 0.09523 0.01727 5.51439 -0.03793 
b  0.58854 0.43516 0.09532 0.01732 5.50398 -0.22656 
d  0.58773 0.29693 0.09544 0.01729 5.52030 0.06926 
h  0.58559 -0.06826 0.09521 0.01725 5.51890 0.04376 
v  0.58665 0.11263 0.09524 0.01728 5.51224 -0.07687 
S
L  0.58701 0.17406 0.09458 0.01734 5.45544 -1.10650 
U
L  0.58660 0.10410 0.09533 0.01712 5.56790 0.93206 
H  0.58701 0.17406 0.09553 0.01734 5.51001 -0.11737 
tA  0.59212 1.04609 0.09631 0.01758 5.47858 -0.68703 
tK  0.58518 -0.13823 0.09520 0.01724 5.52158 0.09232 
Baseline 0.58599  0.09522 0.01726 5.51648  
Note: Since c has no impact on the static model, we do not investigate its effect. All values are 
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE STATICS RESULTS FOR 
DYNAMIC MODEL 













Entrepreneurial overload in 
training unskilled labor α  -0.2526 -0.0531 0.1266 5.5233 0.1191 
Diminishing rate of 
unskilled workers β  -0.1331 -0.0348 0.0656 5.4713 -0.8233 
Entrepreneurial overload in 
training skilled labor 
γ  -0.1843 -0.0531 0.0961 5.5233 0.1191 
Diminishing rate of effective 
labor hired in integrated 
production 
δ  -0.9523 -0.2364 0.4622 5.6000 1.5102 
Cost before quality 
adjustment 
ρ  0.5154 0.1301 -0.2395 5.4828 -0.6150 
Diminishing rate of manual 
component 
χ  1.4028 0.3317 -0.6818 5.4743 -0.7686 
Inefficiency of network 
knowledge contributing to 
present period output 
a  0.0887 0.0202 -0.0412 5.5087 -0.1453 
Inverse of matching between 
domestic firms and overseas 
supplier 
b  0.6348 0.1484 -0.3005 5.4885 -0.5108 
Diminishing rate of effective 
labor hired in outsourcing d  0.4300 0.1118 -0.2090 5.5260 0.1690 
Human capital in foreign 
labor market h  -0.0990 -0.0165 0.0503 5.5349 0.3299 
Decrease in efficiency of 
foreign labor producing low-
skilled intensive components 
v  0.1741 0.0385 -0.0717 5.5087 -0.1453 
Skilled labor supply 
S
L  0.2594 0.0568 -0.1175 5.4368 -1.4484 




0.1570 0.0385 -0.0717 5.5789 1.1286 
Human capital in local labor 
market H  0.2594 0.0568 -0.1175 5.4943 -0.4066 
Inefficiency of last period 
aggregate stock contributing 
to current network 
knowledge 
1n  -0.0137 -0.0348 -0.1785 5.5029 -0.2501 
Inefficiency of last period 
aggregate stock contributing 
to current network 
knowledge 
2n  -0.2867 -0.2547 0.1114 5.5174 0.0137 
Aggregate productivity in 
evolution of network 
knowledge stock 
1C  1.9147 1.8894 0.4927 5.4358 -1.4670 
Aggregate productivity in 
evolution of integrated 
productivity stock 
2C  1.8635 1.6878 -0.6666 5.4551 -1.1172 
baseline ws/wu    5.5167  
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A 1% increase in parameter 











Inverse of networking 
efficiency in outsourcing 
mode 
1k  -0.0137 -0.0531 -0.3005 5.5192 0.0449 
Inverse of networking 
efficiency in integrated 
production mode 
2k  -0.3038 -0.2730 0.1114 5.5174 0.0137 
Rate at which previous 
network knowledge 
depreciates. 
1ε  -0.0478 -0.1997 -1.1547 5.5233 0.1191 
Rate at which previous 
integrated productivity stock 
depreciates. 
2ε  -1.8055 -1.6475 0.6452 5.5928 1.3800 
baseline ws/wu    5.5167  
Note: Since c has no impact on the static model, we do not investigate its effect. The values are 
corrected to 4 significant figures 
 
3.6.1 Cost Before Quality Adjustment, ρ    
We now consider how the economy evolves to its new steady state when there is a 
decrease in ρ , which is the cost before quality or productivity adjustment. As mentioned 
earlier, such cost can also be seen as service link cost which is related to transportation, 
communication and coordination cost and the degree of openness of the developing 
country. In the short run, the portion of firms involved in vertical integration decreases. 
Intuitively, as the service link cost decreases, the cost of purchasing low quality final 
components subsequently decreases. Thus, firms are encouraged to purchase more 
manual components instead of producing them in-house. This is consistent with 
Grossman and Helpman (2003) whereby a decrease in trading costs will encourage 
outsourcing. Similarly, 
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FIGURE 3-1: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL ABILITY 
*
tm  FOR 1% DECREASE IN ρ  
 
In both short and long runs, a decrease in ρ  causes wage inequality to increase. 
This is because firms demand more skilled labor as the demand for outsourcing mode 
rises. Subsequently, the wage gap increases and converges to a higher new steady state as 
seen in Figure 3-2. It is to be noted that we have presented the figures with time periods 
till 160 so as to provide a clear picture that each endogenous variables will converge to a 
new steady state in the long run. In contrast, the figures for GDP and its various 
components are presented with time periods till 40 for the benefit of readers to clearly 
observe the changes that occur within the first few time periods.     
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It can be seen from Figure 3-3 that GDP will initially overshoot in the short run as 
the total profits for all firms in outsourcing increase more than the fall in labor income. 
However, it will eventually diminish as the fall in both skilled and unskilled labor income 
outweighs the increase in total profits even though the labor income gap has increased. 
Hence, it can be seen that the welfare of entrepreneurs increases although that for both 
types of labor declines over time. We also observe that the pattern of labor income 
inequality is similar to that of wage inequality, mainly because the supply stocks of 
skilled and unskilled labor are constant over time. 
FIGURE 3-3: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN ρ  









FIGURE 3-4: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN ρ  
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FIGURE 3-5: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN ρ  















FIGURE 3-6: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN ρ  



















FIGURE 3-7: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN ρ  



















  34  
FIGURE 3-8: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN ρ  
























3.6.2 Changes In Parameters Affecting Networking Of Both Types Of Entrepreneurs 
3.6.2.1 A Decrease In Inverse Of Networking Efficiency In Outsourcing Mode, 1k  
To examine the impact of networking in outsourcing or integrated activities by 
entrepreneurs on the mode of production chosen, we first isolate the change in parameters 
to that in 1k . In the short run, it is observed that a decrease in inverse of networking 
efficiency in outsourcing initially causes *tm  to jump up in the first period. The reason 
behind the jump is unknown to us. However, in the next period, the decline in *tm  is 
intuitive as entrepreneurs prefer to do more outsourcing due to the increase in networking 
efficiency in outsourcing. However, in the long run, as 1−tT increases further with no 
further decrease in 1k , both tA and tK  increase, causing profits for both integrated and 
outsourcing mode to increase. Differentiating profit equations (21) and (28) with respect 
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Substituting the parameter values from Table 3 into the above equations, we can obtain 






















 respectively. Since the elasticity of integrated 
profit is greater than that of outsourcing, the positive impact on integrated profit is larger 
when the percentage increase in tA  is similar to that in tK , holding other things constant. 
However, it can be seen that other factors do not remain constant. Hence in the short run, 
the direct effect of a fall in 1k dominates whereas integrated productivity stock dominates 
in the long run due to the elasticity effect.  
Correspondingly, wage gap initially decreases and then increases in the short run. 
In the long run, wage inequality converges to a lower steady state as the integrated mode 
of production gains dominance in the economy. 
FIGURE 3-9: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm  FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  
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FIGURE 3-10: EVOLUTION OF COMMON AGGREGATE STOCK tT  FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 1k  










FIGURE 3-11: EVOLUTION OF NETWORK KNOWLEDGE STOCK tK  FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 1k  










FIGURE 3-12: EVOLUTION OF INTEGRATED PRODUCTIVITY STOCK tA  
FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  
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 FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  















We further observe that an increase in networking efficiency among firms 
engaging in outsourcing activities will increase GDP over time as seen in Figure 3-14 
below. The majority of the increase in GDP is contributed by the increase in total profits 
of all firms undertaking the integrated mode of production. Both skilled and unskilled 
workers gain too as the integrated mode of production dominates in the long run. At the 
same time, income inequality falls. In this case, the overall welfare of entrepreneurs has 
decreased. 
FIGURE 3-14: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  





















  38  
FIGURE 3-15: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  












FIGURE 3-16: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  
















FIGURE 3-17: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 1k  
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FIGURE 3-18: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 1k  





















FIGURE 3-19: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN 1k  



























3.6.2.2 A Decrease In Inverse Of Networking Efficiency In Vertically Integrated Mode, 
2k  
Next, isolating the change to that in 2k , a decrease in the inverse of networking 
efficiency in networking among firms undertaking vertical integration implies that the 
demand for outsourcing activities falls. Hence, there is an increase in demand for 
integrated production, as shown by a decrease in *tm . The increase in the accumulation of 





 to rise over time. In contrast, the 
decline in network knowledge stocks due to the fall in demand for outsourcing activities 
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 over time. Hence, integrated production dominates in both short 
and long runs. Subsequently, this results in a narrowing of wage gap. 
Similarly, an increase in the networking efficiency among firms undertaking 
integrated mode of production will cause GDP to increase over time as seen in Figure 3-
25. This increase is due to the dominance of the increase in total profits of all firms 
undertaking the integrated mode of production and labor income over the decrease in total 
profits of all firms undertaking outsourcing mode of production. Hence, workers in the 
domestic economy gain from the increase in 2k . 
FIGURE 3-20: EVOLUTION OF COMMON AGGREGATE STOCK tT  FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 2k  














FIGURE 3-21: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF NETWORK KNOWLEDGE STOCK TO 





 FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  
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FIGURE 3-22: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF INTEGRATED PRODUCTIVITY 





 FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  











FIGURE 3-23:  EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm  FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  
















 FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  
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FIGURE 3-25: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  











FIGURE 3-26: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  















FIGURE 3-27: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  
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FIGURE 3-28: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 2k  





















FIGURE 3-29: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN 2k  

















FIGURE 3-30: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN 2k  
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3.6.3 Changes In Parameters Affecting Both Local And Foreign Labor Markets 
3.6.3.1 An Increase In Human Capital In The Local Labor Market, H  
As the skill profile of the domestic economy is enhanced through an exogenous 
increase in human capital H , vertical integration mode gains a greater share in the 
economy in the short run. This is because the supply of skilled labor has increased, hence 
raising the profit for integrated production more than that for outsourcing. This is mainly 
due to the parameter values whereby d>δ such that the increase in human capital given 
a fixed value of δ  in firms adopting vertical integration will contribute to a higher 
increase in profit than that for firms engaged in international outsourcing, while holding 
d  fixed. In the long run, entrepreneurial ability similarly converges to a higher steady 
state.  
FIGURE 3-31:  EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm  FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  








Hence, wage inequality decreases in both short and long runs since the fall in 
demand for outsourcing will lead to an overall decline in demand for all skilled labor. 
Conversely, demand for unskilled labor increases, thus increasing wages for such workers. 
Figure 3-32 shows the transition of wage gap over time. 
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 FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  

















An increase in the human capital of the local labor market will also result in an 
increasing GDP over time. The increase in total profits of all entrepreneurs undertaking 
the integrated mode of production and total labor income has not only offset the fall in 
total profits of all entrepreneurs engaging in outsourcing activities, but also dominates it.  
 
FIGURE 3-33: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  
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FIGURE 3-34: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  

















FIGURE 3-35: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  















FIGURE 3-36: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
INCREASE IN H  
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FIGURE 3-37: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
INCREASE IN H  


















FIGURE 3-38: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% INCREASE IN H  
























3.6.3.2 An Increase In Human Capital In The Foreign Labor Market, h  
Turning our attention to the foreign economy, a one percent increase in the human 
capital in the foreign labor market h  leads to an increase in outsourcing activities in both 
short and long term periods. Entrepreneurs in the domestic economy will want to take 
advantage of the higher foreign human capital since the quality of outsourced manual 
components have improved, resulting in a lower effective cost. Hence, domestic firms 
prefer to purchase more manual components from the overseas supplier. This results in 
outsourcing gaining a greater share. Wage inequality therefore increases as the demand 
for skilled workers increases. In the long run, based on the same explanations, 
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*
tm converges to a lower, new steady state while wage gap converges to a higher, new 
steady state. 
FIGURE 3-39: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm  FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  



















FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  















An increase in foreign human capital will benefit entrepreneurs engaging in 
outsourcing activities and foreign labor, as seen from the increase in total profits of all 
firms undertaking outsourcing mode of production and the decrease in skilled and 
unskilled labor income. Hence, although GDP initially overshoots in the short run, it is 
dampened by the combined fall in total profits of all firms involved in integrated 
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FIGURE 3-41: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  















FIGURE 3-42: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  
















FIGURE 3-43: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  
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FIGURE 3-44: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
INCREASE IN h  
















FIGURE 3-45: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
INCREASE IN h  



















FIGURE 3-46: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% INCREASE IN h  
























  51  
3.6.4 Change In Parameters Related To Efficiency Of Training 
3.6.4.1 A Decrease In Entrepreneurial Overload In Training Unskilled Labor, α  
In the integrated mode of production, a decrease in entrepreneurial overload in 
training unskilled labor α , will lead to an increase in the efficiency of training such 
workers, hence reducing the training cost. As a result, profit for integrated production 
increases and firms prefer to do production in-house in both short and long runs.  
FIGURE 3-47: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  








Therefore, entrepreneurs demand more unskilled workers relative to skilled 
workers, hence depressing the wage gap. Figure 3-48 shows the transition of wage gap 
over time. It can be seen that wage gap decreases in both short and long runs.  






FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  
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Similar to previous cases, the decrease in entrepreneurial overload in training 
unskilled workers results in the dominance of increase in total profits of all entrepreneurs 
involved in integrated mode of production and labor income over decrease in total profits 
of all entrepreneurs involved in outsourcing mode of production. Hence, GDP increases 
over time.  
FIGURE 3-49: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  









FIGURE 3-50: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  














FIGURE 3-51: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  
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FIGURE 3-52: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN α  




















FIGURE 3-53: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN α  
















FIGURE 3-54: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN α  
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3.6.4.2 A Decrease In Entrepreneurial Overload In Training Skilled Labor, γ  
In the short run, as the entrepreneurial overload in training skilled labor γ  
decreases, the training of skilled labor becomes more efficient such that the cost of 
training them is now lower. This leads to an increase in profit for integration and 
entrepreneurs prefer not to outsource manual components. Hence in both short and long 
term periods, outsourcing gains a lower share. Firms demand less skilled workers and 
instead demand more unskilled workers as more firms switch to integrated production 
mode. Subsequently, the wage gap decreases. In the long run, the wage gap continues to 
fall and converges to a lower steady state. Figures 3-55 and 3-56 show the transition of 
*
tm and wage gap over time. In addition, the impact on GDP is similar to the impact due 
to a decrease in entrepreneurial overload in training unskilled labor. 
FIGURE 3-55: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  


















FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  
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FIGURE 3-57: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  













FIGURE 3-58: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  

















FIGURE 3-59: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  
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FIGURE 3-60: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN γ  


















FIGURE 3-61: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN γ  














FIGURE 3-62: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR 
INCOME TO TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN γ  
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3.6.5 A Change In Parameter Relating To Matching Ability, b  
It is interesting to observe how a decrease in the inverse of matching between 
domestic firms and overseas supplier b  will affect the mode of production and wage 
inequality. Allowing a 1% decrease in b  results in a higher entrepreneurial ability to find 
a suitable match. Subsequently, outsourcing profit rises, hence increasing outsourcing 
activities in both short and long runs. Similarly, as more entrepreneurs switch to 
outsourcing mode of production, they demand more skilled labor relative to unskilled 
labor, resulting in an upward pressure on wage inequality. Thus, the wage gap increases 
in the short run and converges to a higher steady state in the long run as shown by Figure 
3-64 below.  
FIGURE 3-63: EVOLUTION OF THRESHOLD LEVEL OF ENTREPRENURIAL 
ABILITY *tm FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  




















FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  
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It is striking to observe that an increase in matching ability will initially result in a 
sharp increase in GDP, followed by a decline in GDP over time. The increase in profits of 
total entrepreneurs engaged in outsourcing activities has contributed to the initial increase 
in GDP. However, in the long run, the fall in total integrated profits and labor income 
overwhelms the increase in outsourcing profit, causing GDP to be lower than the baseline 
value in the long run. This shows that an increase in outsourcing activities is not 
necessary beneficial to the welfare of the economy all the time. In this case, GDP has 
worsened in the long run. 
 FIGURE 3-65: EVOLUTION OF GDP FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  










FIGURE 3-66: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
INTEGRATED MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  
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FIGURE 3-67: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL PROFITS OF ALL FIRMS UNDERTAKING 
OUTSOURCING MODE OF PRODUCTION FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  
















FIGURE 3-68: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN b  


















FIGURE 3-69: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% 
DECREASE IN b  
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FIGURE 3-70: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF TOTAL SKILLED LABOR INCOME TO 
TOTAL UNSKILLED LABOR INCOME FOR 1% DECREASE IN b  

























Table 7 thus summarizes the relations between a 1% increase in each of the selected 
exogenous parameters and the five endogenous variables. The outcomes in the table 
below are different from what we have discussed in the main text above. For easy 
interpretation and comparison, we have assumed an increase in all the selected exogenous 
parameters. In contrast, in the main text, we have considered increases in domestic and 
foreign human capital whereas other exogenous parameters each experience a decrease so 
as to be consistent with world developments.  
TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES OF COMPARATIVE STATICS EXERCISE FOR 















Cost before quality adjustment ρ  + - + - 
Inverse of networking efficiency in 
outsourcing mode 1
k  - + - - 
Inverse of networking efficiency in 
integrated production mode 2
k  - + - + 
Human capital in local labor market H  + - + - 
Human capital in foreign labor market h  - + - + 
Entrepreneurial overload in training 
unskilled labor 
α  - + - + 
Entrepreneurial overload in training 
skilled labor 
γ  - + - + 
Inverse of matching between domestic 
firms and overseas supplier 
b  + - + - 
 
Similarly, Table 8 shows all the relationships between the 1% increase in each exogenous 
parameters and the welfare of the three major types of players in the economy: 1) 
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entrepreneurs, 2) skilled workers and 3) unskilled workers. From the table, we observe 
that there exists a trade off between the welfare of domestic workers and entrepreneurs. 
 
TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF GDP OUTCOMES OF COMPARATIVE STATICS EXERCISE 
FOR AN INCREASE IN SELECTED PARAMETERS 
















Cost before quality 
adjustment 
ρ  + + - + + 
Inverse of networking 
efficiency in outsourcing 
mode 
1k  - - + - - 
Inverse of networking 
efficiency in integrated 
production mode 
2k  - - + - - 
Human capital in local labor 
market 
H  + + - + + 
Human capital in foreign 
labor market 
h  + - + - - 
Entrepreneurial overload in 
training unskilled labor 
α  - - + - - 
Entrepreneurial overload in 
training skilled labor 
γ  - - + - - 
Inverse of matching between 
domestic firms and overseas 
supplier 
b  + + - + + 
 
3.7 Comparison With Previous Literature Results 
We compare our results with previous literature and present the summaries of the 
differences in Tables 9 and 10. We find that Egger and Grossmann (2005) only examined 
the effects of outsourcing on wage inequality in the short and long runs, whereas Grenier, 
Rubart, Semmler (2004) and DeGroot (2001) have only examined the decision to 
outsource or adopt integrated production in the long run. Hence our model provides a 
richer model by exploring the interdependence between entrepreneurs, skilled and 
unskilled workers. Moreover, previous literature has failed to take into account other 
factors affecting outsourcing and integrated production, such as entrepreneurial overload 
in training unskilled and skilled labor.  
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In our results, a change in skilled (unskilled) labor supply will lead to a decrease 
(increase) in wage inequality respectively. In contrast, Egger and Grossmann (2005) 
postulated that wage inequality remains constant regardless of an increase in high-skilled 
or low-skilled workers. This is because in their model setup the reduction in relative 
wages is offset by the increase in relative wages. For instance, an increase in high-skilled 
labor leads to a decrease in wage gap due to an increase in the skill intensity of 
production labor. However, supporting low-skilled labor becomes more attractive since 
the marginal cost of supporting low-skilled labor is now lower relative to non-supported 
low skilled labor. Thus, as more high-skilled labor is allocated towards non-production 
activities, the skill-intensity of production labor decreases. This results in a narrowing of 
wage gap. 
From Table 9, it can be seen that the decision to adopt integrated production is 
inversely related with unskilled labor supply in DeGroot (2001)s results. According to 
his paper, he postulated that an increase in the scale of economy, whereby labor supply is 
the sum of skilled and unskilled labor supply, will result in an increase in outsourcing. 
This is mainly because the fixed cost of superior technology can now easily be distributed 
over a larger output (the size of the market will restrict the degree of specialization). In 
contrast, in our model, the decision to do integrated production is positively related to 
unskilled labor supply. 
In Table 10, Grenier, Rubart, Semmler (2004) postulated that an increase in the 
number of skilled workers will lead to an increase in the profitability of technology which 
are complementary to skilled labor. Hence, skilled wages increase, resulting in an 
increase in wage inequality.  However, our model shows that wage inequality should fall.  
Comparing our model with a model that performs foreign direct investment (FDI) 
instead of international outsourcing, Davies (2005) has developed a static model of FDI 
whereby the skilled workers of different countries are imperfect substitutes for one 
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another. In addition, the production of HQ services by skilled labor takes place in both 
countries. Thereafter a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) combines the services using 
unskilled labor. Hence, FDI can occur without trade costs or factor-price differences. 
Davies postulated that the increase in the hiring of host countrys skilled labor increases 
home countrys unskilled wages. At the same time, there is an ambiguous effect on home 
countrys skilled wages. Furthermore, an increase in the host production of the 
multinationals good will result in an increase in wage inequality in the home country.  
However, depending on the degree of imperfect substitution of skilled labor, FDI 
will lead to additional wage effects. For instance, if the skilled labor of both home and 
host country are perfect substitutes, home skilled wage will fall as the role of FDI 
increases. In contrast, as the degree of substitutability falls, wage inequality in the home 
country increases as domestic skilled wages increase. In contrast, we show that an 
increase in network knowledge stock in the static model will lead to an unambiguous 
increase in wage inequality. Since Davies has only examined these changes in the short 
run, our model is more realistic as we examine the transition of wage inequality over time.  
According to Grossman and Helpman (2003), they postulated that heterogeneous 
firms in an industry will choose their mode of organization and location of their 
subsidiaries or suppliers, depending on their level of productivity. A fall in trade cost will 
lead to firms with low level of productivity to increase outsourcing to the South. Firms 
with intermediate level of productivity will prefer to perform more FDI while the fraction 
of components in the market produced by vertically integrated firms in the North declines. 
Although we have adopted a different approach from their paper, our model is richer as 
we have examined the endogenous relationship between entrepreneurs decisions to 
outsource and wage inequality. 
To summarize, most literature has focused the impact of international outsourcing 
on wage inequality and failed to endogenize the influential role of entrepreneurship 
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together with wage inequality. Furthermore, they have neglected to compare the welfare 
of entrepreneurs versus domestic workers over time. In contrast, we have not only 
examined the transition of GDP over time, but also compare the welfare of the three 
major types of players in the domestic economy. 
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Entrepreneurial overload in 
training unskilled labor 
+ - + - 
        
+   +   
Diminishing rate of unskilled 
workers 
- - - - 
        
        
Entrepreneurial overload in 
training skilled labor 
+ - + - 
        
+   +   
Diminishing rate of effective 
labor hired in integrated 
production 
+ - + - 
        
        
Cost before quality adjustment - + - +   +  *         
Diminishing rate of manual 
component 
- + - + 
        
        
Inefficiency of network 
knowledge contributing to 
present period output 
- + - + 
        
        
Inverse of matching between 
domestic firms and overseas 
supplier 
- + - + 
        
        
Diminishing rate of effective 
labor hired in outsourcing  
+ + + + 
        
        
Human capital in foreign labor 
market 
+ - + - 
        
        
Decrease in efficiency of foreign 
labor producing low-skilled 
intensive components 
- + - + 
        
        
Skilled labor supply - + - +   -   0   0   
Unskilled labor supply + + + +   -   0   0   
Human capital in local labor 
market 
- + - + 
        
        
Integrated productivity stock - +       -     -   -   
Network knowledge stock + -                     
Inefficiency of last period 
aggregate stock contributing to 
current network knowledge 
    - - 
        
        
Inefficiency of last period 
aggregate stock contributing to 
current network knowledge 
    + - 
        
  
  
+   
Aggregate productivity in 
evolution of network knowledge 
stock 
    - + 
        
        
Aggregate productivity in 
evolution of integrated 
productivity stock 
    - - 
        
        
Inverse of networking efficiency 
in outsourcing mode 
    + - 
        
        
 











































































Inverse of networking efficiency 
in integrated production mode 
    + - 
                
Rate at which previous network 
knowledge depreciates. 
    + - 
                
Rate at which previous 
integrated productivity stock 
depreciates.     + -                 
Note: * stands for ambiguous  
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Entrepreneurial overload in training 
unskilled labor 
+ - + - 
+       
Diminishing rate of unskilled 
workers 
- - - - 
        
Entrepreneurial overload in training 
skilled labor 
+ - + - 
+       
Diminishing rate of effective labor 
hired in integrated production 
+ - + - 
        
Cost before quality adjustment - + - +         
Diminishing rate of manual 
component 
- + - + 
        
Inefficiency of network knowledge 
contributing to present period output 
- + - + 
        
Inverse of matching between 
domestic firms and overseas supplier 
- + - + 
        
Diminishing rate of effective labor 
hired in outsourcing  
+ + + + 
        
Human capital in foreign labor 
market 
+ - + - 
        
Decrease in efficiency of foreign 
labor producing low-skilled intensive 
components 
- + - + 
        
Skilled labor supply - + - + -       
Unskilled labor supply + + + +         
Human capital in local labor market - + - + +       
Integrated productivity stock - +             
Network knowledge stock + -             
Inefficiency of last period aggregate 
stock contributing to current network 
knowledge 
    - - 
-       
Inefficiency of last period aggregate 
stock contributing to current network 
knowledge 
    + - 
        
Aggregate productivity in evolution 
of network knowledge stock 
    - + 
        
Aggregate productivity in evolution 
of integrated productivity stock 
    - - 
        
Inverse of networking efficiency in 
outsourcing mode 
    + - 
        
Inverse of networking efficiency in 
integrated production mode 
    + - 
        
Rate at which previous network 
knowledge depreciates. 
    + - 
        
Rate at which previous integrated 
productivity stock depreciates.     + -         
FDI not considered    *  
Note: * stands for ambiguous  
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4. General Discussion 
After obtaining interesting relationships from the comparative statics analysis, we 
hereby attempt to provide a general discussion on the implications of the selected 
relationships, which tally with world developments, on the domestic economy with 
respect to entrepreneurs decision to perform outsourcing and factor prices.  
In the model, we found that the reduction in the cost before quality adjustment of 
the manual components can lead to an increase in the prevalence of outsourcing activities. 
With the advancement of technology over time, service link costs have been rapidly 
reduced. Such advances have included the advancement in management, human resource, 
information and engineering technology. These technological changes have 
unambiguously led to higher wage inequality which is consistent with Egger and 
Grossmann (2005). Although the welfare of entrepreneurs has been raised, the welfare of 
domestic workers has fallen. 
A reduction in the inverse of matching between domestic firms and overseas 
supplier can lead to an increase in outsourcing activities. This is reinforced by the 
implementation of policies which include the liberalization of the telecommunication 
sector in developing countries such as China and India and the formulation of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) between nations, which can encourage more outsourcing activities. 
However, the prevalence of outsourcing activities will lead to a fall in GDP as the fall in 
welfare of domestic workers dominates the overall increase in that of entrepreneurs. 
Thirdly, entrepreneurs undertaking the integrated mode of production have been 
enhancing their efficiency in training skilled and unskilled workers. Such an increase in 
efficiency will lead to the dominance of integrated production over time. In addition, the 
welfare of the economy is raised, as skilled and unskilled labor earn higher income. Since 
there is a trade off between the welfare of domestic workers and entrepreneurs, the overall 
welfare of entrepreneurs decline.  
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The recent trend of an increase in the human capital of developing countries such 
as China and India has resulted in more outsourcing activities. This is consistent with 
reality as developed countries such as Japan and the U.S have increasingly outsourced 
manual components to these developing countries. Furthermore, to raise the welfare of 
domestic workers, the developed country should seek to actively raise the skill level of 
the economically active through providing skills upgrading courses and providing higher 
education opportunities for the population.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper takes a fresh approach in developing a simple dynamic model for a 
small, developed and open economy, which captures the transition of the two state 
variables, namely integrated productivity and entrepreneurial network knowledge stocks. 
Our motivation arises from the fact that firms are increasingly outsourcing manual 
components to foreign, developing countries, thus establishing networks with affiliates in 
the process. Through the evolution of the two stock variables, previous periods stocks 
have contributed to a common aggregate stock which has spillover effects on all firms in 
the domestic economy in the present period. Moreover, we have endogenized the 
entrepreneurial ability threshold together with skilled and unskilled wages. This paper has 
thus examined the impact of evolution of networking on 1) wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labor 2) the decision to outsource by entrepreneurs and 3) the 
welfare of entrepreneurs versus domestic workers.  
In the long run, both wage inequality and the threshold level of entrepreneurial 
ability undergo a gradual transition to a unique and stable mixed equilibrium, which 
differs from Acemoglu et al. (2002b) whereby only corner solutions exist. This is more 
consistent with the observation made in the real world. In addition, through examining the 
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transition of the threshold level of entrepreneurial ability and wage inequality over time, 
the short-run and long-run impacts on endogenous variables are different in magnitude. 
In comparing the comparative statics for both static and dynamic models, we find 
that the static model is inadequate in explaining the impact of networking on the economy 
since it fails to take into account the transition of the state variables over time. However, 
it is adequate in explaining other exogenous parameters such as human capital in local 
and foreign labor markets and service link cost. We find that the decrease in service link 
cost and increase in human capital of foreign country will increase outsourcing activities 
while increasing wage inequality. In particular, the increase in human capital of the 
domestic economy and decrease in entrepreneurial overload in training both types of 
labor reduce wage inequality, which differ from conventional results. Interestingly, an 
increase in networking efficiency in the outsourcing mode leads to different impacts on 
the endogenous variables in the short and long runs: outsourcing activities will dominate 
in the short run whereas integrated production dominates in the long run. 
 Given the exogenous changes in all the parameters, we also observe that there 
exists a positive correlation between outsourcing activities (which is defined in terms of 
threshold level of entrepreneurial ability) and wage inequality. Thus, they co-move in the 
same direction. 
In addition, we examine the impact of the exogenous parameters on the GDP of 
the domestic economy, as well as the welfare of the three major types of players in the 
economy. Interestingly, we observe that there exists a trade off between the welfare of 
domestic workers and entrepreneurs. This implies that an increase in outsourcing 
activities will reduce the welfare of domestic workers while increasing the overall welfare 
of entrepreneurs. The converse is true when entrepreneurs prefer to undertake integrated 
production. Another striking result is that an increase in outsourcing activities is not 
necessary beneficial to the overall welfare of the domestic economy. An increase in 
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outsourcing activities due to an increase in matching ability of the entrepreneurs actually 
worsens GDP. This is mainly due to the dominance of the decrease in total integrated 
profits and labor income over the increase in total outsourcing profits. 
From these interesting findings, we are able to shed light on world developments, 
which are namely the reduction in transaction and telecommunication costs, increase in 
training efficiency and increase in human capital of developing countries. Finally, we also 
compare our models results with previous studies and find that most papers have 
focused on wage inequality. Our model is thus richer as we explore the endogenous 
relationships between entrepreneurs, skilled and unskilled workers in both short and long 
runs. 
Hence, the above results add a challenge to many of the prevailing views on wage 
inequality and the structure of the economy. Future research could incorporate FDI and 
endogenous human capital accumulation of skilled workers and the subsequent impact on 
wage inequality, GDP, welfare of entrepreneurs and domestic workers and hence growth 
of the economy. It also remains to test the hypothesis empirically, whether the formation 
of the two different types of networking stocks truly affects wage inequality and the 
decision to outsource.  
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APPENDIX A 
i) Proof of Proposition 1 
We substitute equations (17) to (20) into equation (6), and re-express the profit 

































































































t  (A1) 
For the above profit function to be positive, we set 0fItπ . It can be seen that the first 
term in equation (A1) is positive regardless of positive or negative values for β andδ .  





















































































βδ βδ throughout equation (A3) and rearranging the terms, we 
obtain 1pδβ + , hence proving the sufficient condition for Lemma 1. It can easily be seen 
that the necessary condition is satisfied too.  
 
ii) Proof of Proposition 2 
Similarly, we substitute equations (26) and (27) back into equation (7): 


















































































1  (A4) 
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For outsourcing profit to be positive, we set 0fOtπ . It can be seen too that the first term 
in equation (A1) is positive regardless of positive or negative values for d and χ .  Hence, 
focusing on the second term in the equation: 


























dd ddd     (A5) 






















f      (A6) 
Dividing ( ) χχχ −−ddd 1 1 throughout equation (A6) and rearranging the terms, we 
obtain 1pχ+d , thus proving the sufficient condition for Proposition 2. Similarly, it can 
easily be seen that the necessary condition is satisfied too.  
 
iii) Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove that the conditions must be given so that an interior solution 10 * pp tm  exists, 
we use equation (29): 
























































































*     (A7) 
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 Assumptions in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 prove that 0* ftm . This is mainly 
because under both the assumptions whereby 1pδβ +  and 1pχ+d , W  and S  are 














are between zero and one, it can be easily seen that the right hand side of 
equation (A7) is greater than zero, hence proving 0* ftm . 
To prove that condition 3 must be given so that 1* ptm  : 

























































































          (A10) 
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Rearranging the terms, we can rewrite equation (A11) as:  
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )


























































At this point, given that wages are not yet endogenized, it can be seen that equation (A12) 
must hold in order for 1* ptm . To illustrate this, if 
u
tw  increases, 
s
tw  must increase too. 
However, the magnitude of increase in stw cannot be too large until it exceeds the left 
hand side of equation (A12), hence violating the third condition. Intuitively, when 
equation (A12) is violated, no entrepreneurs will choose to undertake outsourcing mode 
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of production when stw  is too large, which implies that skilled workers are too expansive 
to be hired.  
